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Abstract
The “significance filter” refers to focusing exclusively on statisti-
cally significant results. Since frequentist properties such as unbiased-
ness and coverage are valid only before the data have been observed,
there are no guarantees if we condition on significance. In fact, the
significance filter leads to overestimation of the magnitude of the pa-
rameter, which has been called the “winner’s curse”. It can also lead
to undercoverage of the confidence interval. Moreover, these problems
become more severe if the power is low. While these issues clearly
deserve our attention, they have been studied only informally and
mathematical results are lacking. Here we study them from the fre-
quentist and the Bayesian perspective. We prove that the relative
bias of the magnitude is a decreasing function of the power and that
the usual confidence interval undercovers when the power is less than
50%. We conclude that failure to apply the appropriate amount of
shrinkage can lead to misleading inferences.
1 Introduction
The long-standing debate about the role of statistical significance in research
[17], [15] has recently intensified [19],[3],[20],[14],[1] and [11]. Looking back
to the beginning, we find that Ronald Fisher wrote in 1926 [6]:
“Personally, the writer prefers to set a low standard of significance
at the 5 per cent point, and ignore entirely all results which fail
to reach this level.”
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In other words, Fisher considered the familiar 5% level to be quite liberal
and recommended that results that fail to reach even that level can be safely
ignored. Now, more than 90 years later, Fisher’s advice to apply the “signifi-
cance filter” is widely followed. Recently, Barnett and Wren [2] collected over
968,000 confidence intervals extracted from abstracts and over 350,000 inter-
vals extracted from the full-text of papers published in Medline (PubMed)
from 1976 to 2019. We converted these to z-values and their distribution is
shown in Figure 1. The under-representation of z-values between -2 and 2 is
striking.
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Figure 1: The distribution of more than one million z-values from Medline
(1976–2019).
As time and resources are always limited, it certainly makes sense to focus
on significant results to avoid chasing noise. However, there is a problematic
side-effect; considering only results that have reached statistical significance
leads to overestimation [10]. This is sometimes called the “winner’s curse”.
Moreover, it has been demonstrated informally, i.e. by simulation, that the
winner’s curse is especially severe when the power is low [10],[7]. Here, we
provide the first formal proof of this important fact.
As it turns out, low power is very common in the biomedical sciences
[4],[5]. In particular, so-called pilot studies often have extremely low power.
When such a study yields a significant result, the effect is likely grossly
overestimated. Unfortunately, effect estimates from significant pilot studies
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are often used to inform the sample size calculation of a larger trial [13],[7].
Low power also occurs when some correction is used to adjust for multiple
comparisons. Such corrections are especially severe in genomics research,
and the resulting overestimation of effects is well known [9]. The recent
suggestion to lower the significance level to improve reproducibility [3] also
reduces power, and therefore may backfire by aggravating the winner’s curse
[14].
While the winner’s curse is a relatively well known phenomenon, math-
ematical results are lacking. In the first part of this paper, we study the
winner’s curse both the frequentist point of view. We prove that the relative
bias in the magnitude is a decreasing function of the power. We also examine
the effect of the significance filter on the coverage of confidence intervals and
find it results in undercoverage when the power is less than 50%.
In the second part of the paper, we study the significance filter from the
Bayesian perspective. We conclude that it is necessary to apply shrinkage.
We end the paper with a short discussion.
2 The frequentist perspective
Suppose that b is a normally distributed, unbiased estimator of β with stan-
dard error se > 0. We have in mind that β is some regression coefficient such
as a difference of means, a slope, a log odds ratio or log hazard ratio, and we
shall sometimes refer to β as the “effect”.
2.1 Bias of the magnitude
By Jensen’s inequality, |b| is positively biased for |β|. Indeed, given β, |b| has
the folded normal distribution with mean
E(|b| | se, β) = |β|+
√
2
pi
se e−β
2/2se2 − 2|β|Φ
(
−|β|
se
)
. (1)
Proposition 1. The bias E(|b| | se, β) − |β| is positive for all se and β.
Moreover, it is decreasing in |β| and increasing in se.
The proposition asserts that in low powered studies (small effects and large
standard errors), the magnitude of the effect tends to be overestimated. For
fixed se, the bias E(|b| | se, β)− |β| is maximal at β = 0 where it is equal to√
2/pi se ≈ 0.8 se.
Importantly, the bias in the magnitude becomes even larger if we con-
dition on |b| exceeding some threshold. This “significance filter” happens
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when journals preferentially accept results that are statistically significant
(i.e. |b| > 1.96se) but also when authors or readers choose to focus on such
promising results as per Fisher’s advice. We have the following extension of
Proposition 1.
Theorem 1. The conditional bias E(|b| | se, β, |b|/se > c) − |β| is positive
for all se and β. Moreover, it is decreasing in |β| and increasing in se and c.
We define the relative conditional bias as
E(|b| | se, β, |b|/se > c)− |β|
|β|
and the exaggeration ratio or type M error [7] as E(|b| | se, β, |b| > c)/|β|.
Corollary 1. The relative conditional bias is positive and and the exag-
geration factor is greater than 1. Both depend on β and se only through the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) |β|/se. Both quantities are decreasing in the SNR
and increasing in c.
We illustrate this result in Figure 2. Now the power for two-sided testing
of H0 : β = 0 at level 5% is
P (|b| > 1.96 se | β, se) = Φ(SNR− 1.96) + 1− Φ(SNR + 1.96),
which is a strictly increasing function of the SNR. Hence, the relative condi-
tional bias and the exaggeration factor are decreasing functions of the power,
as was already noted on the basis of simulation in [10] and [7].
2.2 Coverage
The significance filter also has consequences for the coverage of confidence
intervals. We start by recalling their definition. Suppose a random variableX
is distributed according to some distribution fθ. A (1−α)×100% confidence
set S(X) is a random subset of the parameter space such that
P (θ ∈ S(X) | θ) = 1− α,
for all θ [12]. A negatively biased semi-relevant (or recognizable) set R is a
subset of the sample space such that
P (θ ∈ S(X) | θ,X ∈ R) < 1− α,
for all θ . It is quite problematic if such a set R exists, for is it still reasonable
to report S(X) with (1 − α) × 100% confidence, after the event X ∈ R has
been observed?
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Figure 2: The exaggeration factor as a function of the SNR and the power,
when conditioning on significance at the 5% level (c = 1.96).
Semi-relevant sets have been constructed in various situations, most no-
tably in case of the standard one-sample t-interval [12]. Lehmann [12] called
the existence of certain relevant sets “an embarrassment to confidence the-
ory”. Now suppose b is normally distributed with mean β and known stan-
dard deviation se. If we define
S(b) = {β : |b− β|/se < z1−α/2}
where z1−α/2 is the 1−α/2 quantile of the standard normal distribution, then
we have the following confidence statement
P (β ∈ S(b) | β, se) = P (|b− β|/se < z1−α/2 | β, se) = 1− α,
for all 0 < α < 1, β and se > 0. Lehmann [12] shows that in this particular
setting, there do not exist any negatively biased semi-relevant sets. This is
certainly reassuring. However, we if c > 0, then the conditional coverage
P (|b− β|/se < z1−α/2 | β, se, |b|/se > c)
depends on β and se. This dependence is not simple. For instance, it is not
monotone in β. We do have the following Theorem.
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Theorem 2. Suppose b is normally distributed with mean β and standard
deviation se. If the SNR |β|/se is less than z = z1−α/2 then
P (|b− β|/se < z | β, se, |b|/se > z) < P (|b− β|/se < z | β, se) = 1− α. (2)
Note that if the SNR is equal to z1−α/2, then the power for testing H0 :
β = 0 at level α is slightly more than 50%. So the Theorem implies that if we
have a significant result while the power is 50% or less, then the confidence
interval will not reach its nominal coverage.
The result is quite sharp. By inspecting the proof, we can see that if the
SNR is slightly larger than z1−α/2 then the conditional coverage exceeds the
nominal (unconditional) coverage.
3 The Bayesian Perspective
Bayesian inference is valid conditionally on the data, and so the significance
filter should not pose any difficulties. On the other hand, Bayesian estimators
are naturally biased. In this section we compare the performance of the
unbiased estimator b and the Bayes estimator.
Let us assume that β has a normal prior distribution with mean 0 and
known standard deviation τ > 0. The conditional distribution of β given b
is normal with mean b∗ = τ 2b/(se2 + τ 2) and variance v = se2τ 2/(se2 + τ 2).
We will write s =
√
v. Note that b∗ is the Bayes estimator (under squared
error loss) of β. Clearly, |b∗| < |b| and for that reason b∗ is called a shrinkage
estimator.
We can evaluate b and b∗ as estimators of β conditionally on the parameter
and averaged over the distribution of the data, which is the frequentist point
of view. Alternatively, we can condition on the data and average over the
distribution of the parameter, which is the Bayesian point of view. We have
the following nicely symmetric situation, where we consider se and τ to be
fixed and known.
E(b− β | β) = 0 and E(b∗ − β | β) = − se
2
se2 + τ 2
β (3)
E(b− β | b) = se
2
se2 + τ 2
b and E(b∗ − β | b) = 0 (4)
So, from the frequentist point of view, b is unbiased for β and b∗ is biased.
However, from the Bayesian point of view, it is the other way around!
6
3.1 Bias of the magnitude
Now, if we are interested in the magnitude of β, then we could take the
posterior mean of |β| as an estimator. However, it is still relevant to evaluate
the performance of |b∗| as an estimator of |β| from the Bayesian point of
view. Conditionally on s and b∗, β has the normal distribution with mean b∗
and standard deviation s and hence |β| has the folded normal distribution.
Similarly to Proposition 1, we have the following.
Proposition 2. The difference E(|β| | s, b∗)−|b∗| is positive. It is decreasing
in |b∗| and increasing in s. Moreover, the difference vanishes as |b∗| tends to
infinity.
So, conditionally on the data, |b∗| underestimates |β| on average, but the
difference disappears if we focus on large or significant effects. So now the
significance filter actually reduces the bias in the magnitude! In other words,
shrinkage lifts the winner’s curse.
So far, we have conditioned either on the parameter or the data, and averaged
over the other. However, in practice we do not keep the parameter fixed and
repeat the experiment many times. We also do not keep the data fixed and
vary the parameter. So, it is also relevant to consider the performance of b
and b∗ on average over the distribution of both the parameter and the data. If
the distribution of the parameter represents some field of research, then this
averaging will provide insight into how our statistical procedures perform
when used repeatedly in that field.
Under our simple model, the marginal distribution of b is normal with
mean zero and variance se2+τ 2 and the marginal distribution of b∗ is normal
with mean zero and variance τ 4/(se2 + τ 2). So, trivially, E(b) = E(b∗) =
E(β) = 0. Moreover, it is easy to see that the variance of b∗ is less than the
variance of b. Marginally, |β|, |b| and |b∗| have half-normal distributions with
means
E |b∗| = τ
2
√
se2 + τ 2
√
2
pi
, E|β| = τ
√
2
pi
, E|b| =
√
se2 + τ 2
√
2
pi
(5)
It is easy to see that
E |b∗| < E|β| < E|b|. (6)
Negative bias is more conservative than positive bias, and that may be prefer-
able in many situations. It is interesting to note that the factor by which |b|
overestimates |β| is the same as the factor by which |b∗| underestimates it.
That is,
E|b|
E|β| =
E|β|
E|b∗| =
√
se2 + τ 2
τ
. (7)
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Moreover, the following proposition says that the bias of |b∗| is smaller (on
average) than the bias of |b|.
Proposition 3. Suppose β has a normal prior distribution with mean 0 and
standard deviation τ > 0. Suppose that conditionally on β, b is normally
distributed with mean β standard error se > 0. Let b∗ = E(β | b), then
E(|b| − |β|) > E(|β| − |b∗|). (8)
Most importantly, however, while the bias of |b| increases as we condition on
|b| exceeding some threshold, the bias of |b∗| vanishes!
Theorem 3. As c goes to infinity, E(|b∗| − |β| | |b| > c) vanishes.
3.2 Coverage
We now return to the coverage issue we discussed in section 2.2. It might seem
that Theorem 2 is not much of a problem in practice because conditional on
a significant result, the power is unlikely to be small. But such an argument
would depend on the (prior) distribution of the signal-to-noise ratio |β|/se.
We have the following result.
Theorem 4. Suppose β and se are distributed such that the SNR |β|/se has
a decreasing density and |β|/se and se are independent. Also suppose that
conditionally on β and se, b is normally distributed with mean β and standard
deviation se. For every 0 < α < 1
P (|b− β| < z1−α/2se | |b|/se > c) < 1− α. (9)
This result suggest that across research fields where of the SNR has a
decreasing density, confidence interval undercover on average. But how re-
alistic is it to assume such a decreasing density? Clearly, it would imply a
decreasing density of the absolute z-value, and this is certainly not the case
in Figure 1. However we believe that this is due to selective reporting.
We have made an effort to collect an unselected sample of z-values as
follows. It is a fairly common practice in the life sciences to build multivariate
regression models by “univariable screening”. First, the researchers run a
number of univariable regressions for all predictors that they believe could
have an important effect. Next, those predictors with a p-value below some
threshold are selected for the multivariate model. While this approach is
statistically unsound, we believe that the univariable regressions should be
largely unaffected by selection on significance, simply because that selection
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is still to be done. For further details, we refer to [18]. We do note that in
that article, we discarded p-values below 0.001, but these are included here.
We have collected 732 absolute z-values from 51 recent articles from Med-
line. We show the distribution in Figure 3 which suggest a decreasing distri-
bution of the absolute z-values, which implies a that the distribution of the
SNR is decreasing as well.
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Figure 3: The distribution of 732 absolute z-values from Medline. Here we
made an effort to avoid the significance filter.
4 Discussion
In this paper we have considered the generic situation where we have an
unbiased, normally distributed estimator b of a parameter β, with known
standard error se. Frequentist properties, such as the unbiasedness of b and
the coverage of the confidence interval are only meaningful before the data
have been observed. Once the data are in, they become meaningless since
b is just some fixed number and the confidence interval either covers β or it
does not. Nothing more can be said without specifying a (prior) distribution
for β.
However, suppose we condition not on (b, se) but only on the event |b| >
1.96 se. That is, we condition on statistical significance at the 5% level. Now
b is still random and we can talk about bias and coverage. Conditionally on
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significance, b is biased away from zero. This tendency to overestimate the
magnitude of significant effects is sometimes called the “winner’s curse”. It
is especially severe when the signal-to-noise ratio |β|/se is low. Also, if the
SNR is low, then conditionally on significance the confidence interval will
undercover. By providing mathematical proofs of these facts, we hope to
contribute to the awareness of these very serious problems.
The goal of hypothesis testing is to try to avoid chasing noise, which is
perfectly reasonable. However, the consequence of focusing on significant
results is that all the nice frequentist properties no longer hold. Many pro-
posals have been made to address this issue. From a frequentist point of view,
one could condition throughout on statistical significance. See, for example,
[8] and references therein. Alternatively, one can take a Bayesian approach,
such as proposed by [21] and ourselves [18]. Of course, the Bayesian approach
relies on correct specification of the prior.
Shrinkage is often viewed as a method to achieve a lower mean squared
error by reducing the variance at the expense of increasing the bias. Our
most important point is that it is necessary to apply shrinkage to reduce the
bias that results from focusing on interesting results.
A Appendix
Proposition 1. The bias E(|b| | se, β) − |β| is positive for all se and β.
Moreover, it is decreasing in |β| and increasing in se.
Proof. This is a special case of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. The conditional bias E(|b| | se, β, |b|/se > c) − |β| is positive
for all se and β. Moreover, it is decreasing in |β| and increasing in se and c.
Proof. Let Z be a standard normal random variable and define
g(θ, c) = E (|θ + Z| − θ | |θ + Z| ≥ c) . (10)
Since
E(|b| | se, β, |b|/se > c)− |β| = seg(|β|/se, c) (11)
it is clear that it is enough to prove that g(θ, c) is decreasing in θ > 0 and
increasing in c > 0.
Suppose c1 < c2. For any random variable X we have that
E(X | X ≥ c2) ≥ E(X),
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since E(X | X < c2) ≤ c2 ≤ E(X | X ≥ c2) and E(X) is a convex com-
bination of the two conditional expectations. Now we can replace X by
X˜ = E(X | X ≥ c1), and we conclude that g is increasing in c > 0.
To prove that g(θ, c) is decreasing in θ > 0, note that the density of |Z+θ|
is given by
f(y) =
{
φ(y − θ) + φ(y + θ), y ≥ 0
0, y < 0.
Here φ is the standard normal density. Using that zφ(z) = −φ′(z),
g(θ, c) =
∫∞
c
(y − θ)(φ(y − θ) + φ(y + θ)) dy
P (|Z + θ| ≥ c)
=
∫∞
c
−φ′(y − θ)− φ′(y + θ)− 2θφ(y + θ) dy
P (|Z + θ| ≥ c)
=
φ(c− θ) + φ(c+ θ)− 2θ(1− Φ(c+ θ))
2− Φ(c− θ)− Φ(c+ θ) . (12)
We split g(θ, c) into the numerator and the denominator:
N = φ(c− θ) + φ(c+ θ)− 2θ (1− Φ(c+ θ))
and
D = 2− Φ(c− θ)− Φ(c+ θ).
Now it is enough to check that
D · ∂N
∂θ
≤ N · ∂D
∂θ
.
So
∂N
∂θ
= −φ′(c− θ) + φ′(c+ θ)− 2(1− Φ(c+ θ)) + 2θφ(c+ θ)
= (c− θ)(φ(c− θ)− φ(c+ θ))− 2(1− Φ(c+ θ)),
and
∂D
∂θ
= φ(c− θ)− φ(c+ θ).
Introduce
z− = c− θ and z+ = c+ θ.
Then
D · ∂N
∂θ
≤ N · ∂D
∂θ
⇐⇒
D · z− (φ (z−)− φ (z+))− 2D · (1− Φ (z+)) ≤ N · (φ (z−)− φ (z+)) ⇐⇒
(φ (z−)− φ (z+)) (D · z− −N) ≤ 2D · (1− Φ (z+)) . (13)
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The right-hand-side of (13) is clearly positive, and it is not hard to see that
the first factor of the left-hand-side is also positive: for |z−| ≤ z+ we have
φ (z−)− φ (z+) ≥ 0.
Therefore, we can show that (13) is true, if we can show that
D · z− −N ≤ 0. (14)
We can see that
D · z− −N = z− (1− Φ(z−)) + z− (1− Φ(z+))− φ(z−)− φ(z+) + 2θ(1− Φ(z+))
= z− (1− Φ(z−))− φ(z−) + z+ (1− Φ(z+))− φ(z+). (15)
We now use the fact that for all z ∈ R,
z(1− Φ(z))− φ(z) ≤ 0,
which follows from the fact that the derivative of this function (i.e. 1−Φ(z))
is positive, and the limit for z → ∞ equals 0. So (15) is indeed negative,
which proves (13), and therefore the fact that g(θ, c) is decreasing in θ ≥ 0.
Corollary 1. The relative conditional bias is positive and and the exagger-
ation factor is greater than 1. Both depend on depend on β and se only
through the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) |β|/se. Both are decreasing in |β|/se
and increasing in c.
Proof. Recall the definition of the function g(θ, c) from (10). The relative bias
is equal to seg(|β|/se, c)/|β| and the exaggeration factor is seg(|β|/se, c)/|β|+
1. We refer to the proof of Theorem 1 where we show that g(θ, c) is decreasing
in θ ≥ 0 and increasing in c ≥ 0. This also establishes the present claim.
Proposition 2. The difference E(|β| | s, b∗)−|b∗| is positive. It is decreasing
in |b∗| and increasing in s. Moreover, the difference vanishes as |b∗| tends to
infinity.
Proof. Comparing to Proposition 1, we see that this is also a special case of
Theorem 1.
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Theorem 2. Suppose b is normally distributed with mean β and standard
deviation se. If |β|/se ≤ z = z1−α/2 then
P (|b−β|/se < z | β, se, |b|/se > z) < P (|b−β|/se < z | β, se) = 1−α. (16)
Proof. There is no loss of generality if we assume β > 0 and se = 1. In
this proof, we will drop conditioning on β and se from our notation. In
fact, without loss of generality we will prove the corresponding statement for
X ∼ N(µ, 1). Also, it is more convenient to work with the complementary
event |X − µ| > z. Since
P (|X − µ| > z | |X| > z) = P (|X| > z| | |X − µ| > z)P (|X − µ| > z)
P (|X| > z)
is suffices to prove that
P (|X| > z| | |X − µ| > z)− P (|X| > z) > 0
for all 0 < µ ≤ z. Now,
P (|X| > z| | |X − µ| > z)− P (|X| > z) =
= P (|X| > z| | X − µ > z)/2 + P (|X| > z | X − µ < −z)/2
− P (|X| > z)
=
1
2
+ P (X > z | X − µ < −z)/2 + P (X < −z | X − µ < −z)/2
− P (X > z)− P (X < −z)
=
1
2
+
Φ(−z − µ)
2Φ(−z) − 1 + Φ(z − µ)− Φ(−z − µ).
Taking the derivative with respect to µ, it is easy to see that this expres-
sion is decreasing in µ > 0. Moreover, if we take µ = z, then we get
Φ(−2z)/2Φ(−z)− Φ(−2z), which is positive because Φ(−z) < 1/2.
Proposition 3. Suppose β has a normal prior distribution with mean 0 and
standard deviation τ > 0. Suppose that conditionally on β, b is a normally
distributed with mean β standard error se > 0. Let b∗ = E(β | b), then
E(|b| − |β|) > E(|β| − |b∗|). (17)
Proof. We have to show that
√
se2 + τ 2 − τ ≥ τ − τ
2
√
se2 + τ 2
.
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Multiplying by
√
se2 + τ 2 and rearranging we obtain
se2 + τ 2 − 2τ
√
se2 + τ 2 + τ 2 ≥ 0.
The left hand side of this equality is equal to (
√
se2 + τ 2−τ)2 which is clearly
positive unless se is zero.
Theorem 3. As c goes to infinity, E(|b∗| − |β| | |b| > c) vanishes.
Proof. Since the marginal distribution of b is symmetric around zero, we have
for positive c
E(|b∗| | |b| > c) = τ
2
se2 + τ 2
E(|b| | |b| > c) = τ
2
se2 + τ 2
E(b | b > c) (18)
Conditionally on b > c, b has the truncated normal distribution. Hence
τ 2
se2 + τ 2
E(b | b > c) = τ
2
se2 + τ 2
√
se2 + τ 2
ϕ(c/
√
se2 + τ 2)
1− Φ(c/√se2 + τ 2)
=
τ 2ϕ(c/
√
se2 + τ 2)√
se2 + τ 2(1− Φ(c/√se2 + τ 2)) (19)
Turning to |β|, we have by symmetry,
E(|β| | |b| > c) = E(|β| | b > c). (20)
Moreover,
E(|β| | b > c) = E(β | b > c) + E(|β| − β | b > c). (21)
By a result due to Rosenbaum [16] concerning the mean of a truncated bi-
variate normal distribution, we have
E(β | b > c) = τ
2ϕ(c/
√
se2 + τ 2)√
se2 + τ 2(1− Φ(c/√se2 + τ 2)) . (22)
Since this expression is equal to (19), we only need to show that
lim
c→∞
E(|β| − β | b > c) = 0.
Since P (β < 0 | b > c)→ 0 as c→∞, this is clearly true.
To prove Theorem 4, we use the following Lemma.
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Lemma 1. Let X be a random variable and g an increasing function that is
not constant on the support of X. Then for every x such that P (X > x) > 0
E(g(X) | X < x) < E(g(X)).
Proof. E(g(X)) is a convex combination of E(g(X) | X < x) and E(g(X) |
X ≥ x). Since g is increasing
E(g(X) | X < x) ≤ E(g(X) | X ≥ x).
If g is not constant on the support of X, then the inequality is strict and the
claim follows.
To prove Theorem 4, we first prove the following Proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose µ is distributed such that |µ| has a decreasing den-
sity f . Also suppose Z is independent of µ and has a distribution which is
symmetric around zero and supported on the whole real line. Let X = Z+µ.
For every positive c and z
P (|X − µ| < z | |X| > c) < P (|X − µ| < z). (23)
Proof. Since Z = X − µ, we can rewrite the claim as
P (|Z| < z | |Z + µ| > c) < P (|Z| < z).
Because,
P (|Z| < z | |Z + µ| > c) = P (|Z + µ| > c | |Z| < z)P (|Z| < z)
P (|Z + µ| > c)
the claim is equivalent to
P (|Z + µ| > c | |Z| < z) < P (|Z + µ| > c), (24)
for all positive z and c. If we define
g(z) = P (|Z + µ| > c | |Z| = z)
then
P (|Z + µ| > c | |Z| < z) = E(g(|Z|) | |Z| < z).
Now we can use Lemma 1 to prove our claim by showing that g is increasing
and not constant. Since the distribution of Z is symmetric around zero, its
sign and magnitude are independent. Therefore,
g(z) = P (|Z + |µ|| > c | |Z| = z). (25)
15
Using the independence of Z and µ, we have
g(z) = P (|z + |µ|| > c)/2 + P (| − z + |µ|| > c)/2
= P (z + |µ| > c)/2 + P (z + |µ| < −c)/2
+ P (−z + |µ| > c)/2 + P (−z + |µ| < −c)/2
=
{
P (|µ| > c− z)/2 + P (|µ| > c+ z)/2, if z ≤ c
1
2
+ P (|µ| > c+ z)/2 + P (|µ| < −c+ z)/2, if z > c
Taking the derivative, we have
g′(z) =
{
f(c− z)− f(c+ z), if z ≤ c
−f(c+ z) + f(−c+ z), if z > c
= f(|z − c|)− f(z + c) ≥ 0.
f is not constant since it is a (proper) density. It follows that g′ cannot be
identically zero and hence g is not constant either.
Theorem 4. Suppose β and se are distributed such that |β|/se has a decreas-
ing density and |β|/se and se are independent. Also suppose that conditionally
on β and se, b is normally distributed with mean β and standard deviation
se. For every 0 < α < 1
P (|b− β| < z1−α/2se | |b|/se > c) < 1− α. (26)
Proof. For every se > 0, it follows from Proposition 1 that
P (|X − µ| < z1−α/2se | se, |X|/se > c) < P (|X − µ| < z1−α/2se | se) = 1− α.
Averaging over se, the claim follows.
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